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Drawing on the theoretical discussion of common features of cultures in the post-Soviet
space, this paper proposes to refocus on the linguistic dimension and to investigate post-
Russian Eurasia. Is not the role of the Russian language coming under serious challenge in
the post-Soviet context, where independent states are downgrading the status of Russian
in administration and education and where ethnic Russians are ‘remigrating’ from former
Soviet republics to the Russian Federation? There is, however, one medium in which
Russian is gaining new signiﬁcance as a language of inter-regional communication: the
Internet. Albeit to a lesser degree than English and Chinese, Russian serves as a means of
communication between Russian-speaking communities all over the world. What is more,
the Russian Internet (Runet) offers access to elaborated resources of contemporary culture
(video and music downloads etc.).
The paper discusses the role the Russian-based Runet plays for Eurasian webcommunities
outside the Russian Federation, mostly relying on Kazakh material, and asks whether post-
colonial anxieties about Russian cultural imperialism through the Runet are justiﬁed or not
and what the Kazakh, possibly post-colonial strategies of coping with this situation are.
Essential to this essay is the notion of cyberimperialism, which combines aspects of media
studies with post-colonial studies. The interdisciplinary approach to Internet studies is
completed by a linguistic focus on the performativity of language usage online for creating
situational language identities. The essay rounds off by offering an analysis of Nursultan
Nazarbaev’s ambiguous inclusive-exclusive logic of argumentation and confronting it with
Russian Eurasianism.
Copyright  2011, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.orham and Victoria
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“Nowhere in the world has the management of multi-
ethnic states, especially those which have a bilingual
divide, proved to be a simple matter: [.]” (Akiner, 1995,
p. 81)
“[.] Eurasia is also a trope, a ﬁgure of speech. Future
hegemons might still, under certain circumstances, ﬁnd
it useful.” (Gleason, 2010, p. 32)
In which medium have we observed the most signiﬁ-
cant transregional cultural dynamics in the ﬁrst decade ofangUniversity. ProducedanddistributedbyElsevier Limited.All rights reserved.
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only in global respects but also with regard to contempo-
rary Eurasia. That is why it seems appropriate to address
the question of cultural dynamics in contemporary Russia
and Eurasia by focussing on the Internet. In this paper I aim
to discuss the role the Russian-based Runet plays for
Eurasian webcommunities outside the Russian Federation,
mostly relying on Kazakh material.1 With the focus on new
electronic media, I intend to reformulate the common
research agenda of Kazakhstan’s “Russian problem” (see
Kadyrshanow, 1996, p. 7; Eschment, 1998) or the Kazakh-
Russian “dilemma” (Kuzabekova, 2008, p. 167) by narrow-
ing the perspective to the question of whether Kazakhstan
has a problem with the Russian Internet. To answer this
question I turn both to statistical data about Runet usage in
Kazakhstan and to the webpage of the Kazakhstani presi-
dent Nursultan Nazarbaev.
Based on the ﬁndings, I will ask whether post-colonial
anxieties about Russian cultural imperialism through the
Runet are justiﬁed or not and what the Kazakh, possibly
post-colonial strategies of coping with this situation are.
Essential to my essay is the notion of cyberimperialism
(Rusciano, 2001) which combines aspects of media studies
with post-colonial studies. The interdisciplinary approach
to Internet studies as postulated by Pavlenko (2008a,
p. 305–306) will be completed by a linguistic focus on the
performativity of language usage online for creating situ-
ational language identities. Instead of a conclusion I will
round off by offering an analysis of Nazarbaev’s ambiguous
inclusive-exclusive logic of argumentation2 and confront-
ing it with Russian Eurasianism.
2. New paradigms for Eurasian studies?
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the
cultural Sovietisation of Central Asia, which was most
evident in Kazakhstan, the “most thoroughly Sovietized”
Central-Asian culture in the Soviet period (Akiner, 1995,
p. 51), was no longer accepted common ground. The
breakdown of the Soviet Union demolished the plausibility
of the tacit identiﬁcation of everything Soviet with Russian,
which had been practised for decades (cf. Gleason, 2010,
p. 28). Since neither Russian studies nor Sovietology could
provide convincing models to describe the new reality in
the Central-Asian post-Soviet countries anymore, a debate
about alternative concepts began.
In the wake of this debate, concurring constructions of
common features of the former Soviet countries and
cultures such as post-socialism, post-communism and
post-colonialism were proposed, all of them in one way or
the other using the communist past as their starting-point.
Without doubt the countries of the Socialist Second
World share a political legacy of totalitarian experiences,1 My focus is exclusively on language performance, whereas other
relevant aspects of Kazakhstani identity and politics such as religion,
economics, citizenship, authoritarianism, Pan-Turkism or the transfer of
the capital from Almaty to Astana cannot be taken into account (for an
overview see Dave, 2007).
2 As deﬁned in Uffelmann (1999) and applied to (Neo-) Eurasianism in
Höllwerth (2007).but does “post-totalitarian Eurasia” (Saunders, 2009, p. 1)
still constitute a coherent “SecondWorld”, a world living in
the mode “After” (Kujundzic, 2000)? Does the feature of
post-communism as advocated by Boris Groys (2005) really
predetermine the future of the former communist coun-
tries by redirecting them back from the communist utopia
to the past?3 The exclusive focus on the past – on historical
trauma and memory politics – clearly ignores hi-tech
offensives, for example in Estonia, but also in Kazakhstan
(cf. Halbach, 2007, p. 77).
The same orientation towards the past affects post-
socialist or post-Cold War studies (Hann et al., 2002, p. 17).
Here the main problem concerns differences in regional
economics: the effects of the colonial exploitation of
Central Asia for agriculture differ enormously from the
problems the industrialised Central and East European
countries faced during transition:
“The implication is that the central insights gained from
analyses of state socialism and post-socialist trans-
formations in Central and Eastern Europe have little or
nothing to offer for the study of Central Asian societies.”
(Kandiyoti, 2002, p. 240)
Although Hann et al. regard post-Cold War Studies as
a concept broader than post-colonialism (Hann et al., 2002,
p. 18), the varying forms of hegemony, colonialism and
imperialism which the Soviet Union applied to Central-
Asian regions in comparison to East Central European
regions demand a differentiated post-colonial approach. In
the case of East European post-colonial studies, the temp-
tation is less the juxtaposition of post-colonial features in
Eurasia with the “classical” post-colonial countries of Africa
or Latin America (Moore, 2001) but rather the ascription of
global features to all post-socialist regions.4
A proponent of East European and Eurasian post-colonial
studies, David Chioni Moore, acknowledges that the various
post-socialist and post-Soviet regions display huge differ-
ences, most palpably between the East Central European
newmember states of the EU andNATOon the one hand and
Belarus andTurkmenistan on the other. This chasmbecomes
even more obvious if one looks at media technology:
“[.] it is clear that there is no simple explanation for
the current state of new media penetration in the
Second World. One must look deeper to understand
why Shanghai, St. Petersburg, and Split bristle with
cyber-cafés, mobile phone users, and hipster digerati,
while Tirana, Tyumen’, and Tashkent languish in virtual
cul-de-sacs far from the information superhighway.”
(Saunders, 2009, p. 2)
From this one might deduce the necessity of a regional
turn in the various models of post-totalitarian, post-Second
World, post-communist, post-socialist, post-Cold War and
post-colonial studies.3 “[A]us der Zukunft in die Vergangenheit” (Groys, 2005, p. 48). All
translations from Russian, French and German by the author, unless
stated otherwise.
4 “[Z]ones, by their rarity at least, stand not outside but in relation to
a global (post)coloniality” (Moore, 2001, p. 123, emphasis in the original).
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countries”, the Central-Asian republics share other char-
acteristics with South Asia, with the Muslim world, etc.
which makes it attractive to describe them in terms of in-
betweenness. This notion occurs as an implicit diagnosis in
many research texts, not only in those that are informed by
post-colonial studies:
“Kazakhstan is a country at the periphery of three major
civilizations, the Arab-Iranian Muslim, the European
Christian and the South-Asian Buddhist world. A whole
range of oppositions deﬁne its present status.
Kazakhstan is not Europe, but not Asia either; it is
a post-Soviet, but at the same time a post-colonial
country; [.]”5
Could a similar in-betweenness serve as a distinctive
feature of a more strictly conﬁned region, including Russia
and the former southern republics of the Soviet Union but
excluding the Baltic and East Central Europe? Might the
notion of in-betweenness, which is so prominent in post-
colonial studies, provide a new deﬁnition for the Russian
(Neo)Eurasianists’ suspicious hegemonic conceptof Eurasia?
As the spatial turn reached Slavic studies it seemed that
the hitherto dubious geopolitical construction of a distinc-
tive Eurasian entity as promulgated by Eurasianists and
Neo-Eurasianists could be rehabilitated for heuristic
purposes in cultural studies and political science. The ﬁrst
signs are appearing that the disregard of Central Asia,
practised in cultural and social sciences over decades, is
now being countered. Themost recent step in this direction
was the decision taken by the members of AAASS (Amer-
ican Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies) to
change the organisation’s name to ASEEES (Association for
Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies) – a change
which became effective in 2010.
The new global label, however, is not accompanied by
a new all-embracing conceptualisation of the cultural
peculiarities of post-Soviet Central Asia. It rather provides
the general framework for specialised, regionally differen-
tiated area studies. One of the research ﬁelds which has not
gained much attention yet is Central Asian Internet studies.
The Russian concept of (Neo)Eurasianism is viewed in
different ways in the Central-Asian republics. It is either
identiﬁed as an ideological mask for Russian hegemonic
aspirations or as a promising synthesis (cf. Hann et al., 2002,
p.14). Kazakhstan’s ofﬁcial state ideology is built around the
notion of Eurasia but remains vague (cf. Laruelle, 2008, pp.
176–187). Thismeans that research in Central Asian Internet
studies must be conducted in a way which differentiates
both according to different regions and to divergent
understandings of the notion Eurasia. One has to ask in each
case: are we dealing with a phenomenon of the Eurasianet
which includes or excludes Russia, the Russian language
and/or the Russian understanding of Eurasianism?5 “Kasachstan ist ein Land an der Peripherie der drei groben Zivilisa-
tionen, der arabisch-iranisch muslimischen, der europäisch christlichen
und der südasiatisch buddhistischen Welt. Eine ganze Reihe von Oppo-
sitionen bestimmen seinen gegenwärtigen Zustand: Kasachstan ist nicht
Europa, aber auch nicht Asien; es ist einerseits ein postsowjetisches Land,
aber zugleich auch ein Postkolonialland; [.]” (Ibraeva, 2005, p. 407).3. Kazakhstan beyond Russian?
But is not the answer to this question obvious because
Eurasia tends more and more towards a post-Russian
political and linguistic situation? Is not the role of the
Russian language coming under serious challenge in the
post-Soviet context, where independent states are down-
grading the status of Russian in administration and
education and where ethnic Russians are ‘remigrating’
from former Soviet republics to the Russian Federation?
After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, millions of
Russian native speakers6 found themselves in a “beached
diaspora” (Laitin, 1998, p. 29), about six million in the
former Kazakh SSR. The new independent Republic of
Kazakhstan consisted of over 100 ethnic groups, among
which Kazakhs and Russians are by far the biggest, which
gives one the right to speak of an almost bi-national
Kazakh-Russian populace in Kazakhstan. Ethnic Russians
are concentrated in the North and the East of Kazakhstan
(Kadyrshanow,1996, pp.15 and 26), the only area in Central
Asia where there is a common border with Russia.
Suddenly the longest state border in the world cut the ties
of the Northern territories of the Kazakh Soviet Republic
with the Russian Federation. The North’s economy is
directly dependent on the neighbouring Russian industry
(Olcott, 1997, p. 113), and roads connect Kazakhstan’s North
with Russia rather than with the rest of Kazakhstan (cf.
Olcott, 2002, p. 195). Thus on the mental map of the North-
Kazakhstan Russian population the old orientation towards
Russia remained eminent (Braun, 2000, p. 92).
This mental map was challenged by what appeared at
ﬁrst glance to be typical post-colonial attempts of Kazakh
ofﬁcials towards “a deliberate ‘removal’ of the ‘colonial’
language from the public sphere” in the Central-Asian
republics in the early 1990s (Pavlenko, 2008a, p. 282).
Russian toponyms were Kazakhised (for example Tselino-
grad – Akmola – Astana; Akiner, 1995, p. 61) and traces of
Russian in Central-Asian languages erased (Pavlenko,
2008a, p. 283), while calques from Kazakh in the Kazakh-
stanis’ spoken Russian language increased (Shaibakova,
2004). Simultaneously the role of Russian in administra-
tion and education was downgraded (Laruelle and
Peyrouse, 2004, pp. 126–129, 146–140; Pavlenko, 2008a,
pp. 282–283). Nevertheless the generalisation of all
Central-Asian states as “nationalising regimes” which pre-
vailed in studies of nationalism in the 1990s (cf., for
example, Smith et al., 1998, pp. 139–164, still defended in
Dave, 2007, p. 140) is evidently inconsistent with regard to
bi-national Kazakhstan, because the “ethnic redress”
(Schatz, 2000, p. 493) is only one side of the coin in
Kazakhstani internal policy. Justiﬁed fears of a “logic of
titular nationalism”7 and Kazakhisation arose in the mid-
1990s (Akiner, 1995, pp. 71–72), but in the long run6 Since this article is devoted to tropes of argumentation and perfor-
mative situational identities there is no room to discuss the sometimes
outdated, sometimes unreliable and divergent numbers provided in
empirically oriented research literature on the Kazakh-Russian language
question, let alone to contrast them with new ﬁeld research.
7 “Logik des Titularnationalismus” (Kadyrshanow, 1996, p. 6).
9 “C Gpsuearstcfoo9w prGaojiaxj>w j prGaoaw nfstopGp
sanpuPracmfoj> oaracof s laiawsljn pvjxjam:op uPptrfbm>fts>
russljk >i9l.” (http://www.akorda.kz/www/www_akorda_kz.nsf/
sections?OpenForm&id_doc¼DB26C3FF70789C84462572340019E60A&
lang¼ru&L1¼L1&L2¼L1-7, the English translation is taken from Nazar-
baev’s website: http://www.akorda.kz/www/www_akorda_kz.nsf/
sections?OpenForm&id_doc¼DB26C3FF70789C84462572340019E60A&
lang¼en, accessed 1 June 2010).
10 Kuzabekova, 2008, p. 170. For a list of legislative acts see Smagulova,
2008, pp. 449–450.
11 “In diesem Gesetz [vom Juli 1997] fehlen ﬁxe Termini [.] völlig.”
(von Gumppenberg, 2002, p. 101, cf. also Olcott, 1997, p. 115, Dave, 2007, p.
102). But in 2006, in his Kazakhstanskii put’ [The Kazakhstani Way], Naz-
arbaev admits that the legally non-binding term “language of interethnic
communication” had to be made more precise in the constitution of
1995: “[.] russljk >i9l, lal pb8fltjcop oajbpmff rasPrpstraofoo9k,
Pfrfstam oai9cat:s> <rjejyfslj ojyfGp oa ioaya7jn tfrnjopn «>i9l
nfhoaxjpoam:opGp pb7foj>» j Ppmuyjm lpostjtuxjpoo9f Garaotjj
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conﬂicts than the neighbouring republics (Halbach, 2007,
p. 89). Thus the impression that the Russian milieu in
Kazakhstan is “narrowing” is deceiving (Ileuova, 2008).
Despite government support for the Kazakh language in
ofﬁcial contexts the media situation remains plural. The
media law of 1999 prescribing that 50% of all media pro-
grammes must be in Kazakh and only 20% may consist of
rebroadcast material from abroad could not be fulﬁlled by
the media (Adams et al., 2007, p. 85) or is fulﬁlled subver-
sively by broadcasting in Russian during primetime and in
Kazakh late at night (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2004, p. 114). A
majority of the mass media still publish or broadcast in
Russian (Bensmann, 2007, pp. 536–537; Brauer, 2010, p. 7;
Kaftan, 2004; Shaibakova, 2004, p.180; Shaibakova, 2005, p.
51). Whereas newspapers from Russia have become less
available in Kazakhstan (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2004,
p. 109), the blocking of Russian TV from Kazakhstan’s
broadcasting network in the mid-1990s was neutralised by
satellite receivers (Bensmann, 2007, p. 533), and Russian TV
has regained its popularity in Kazakhstan (Brauer, 2010,
p. 8). Thebanningof publications like the journal Lad in 1995
or Komsomol’skaia Pravda in 1996 (Eschment, 1998, pp. 61–
62) occurred occasionally, before in the early 2000s the state
mademore systematic efforts to subordinate the freemedia
to state control (Ibraeva, 2005, pp. 434 and 452). The main
instruments for organising and ﬁltering information are
half-state, half-private media holdings such as Alma-Media,
Khabar or Shahar (cf. Bensmann, 2007, p. 538; Dave, 2007, p.
144) and “state orders” (goszakazy) for journalistic coverage
of politically desirable topics (Brauer, 2010, p. 4).
The demographic situation changed in the 1990s due to
the emigration of members of the “beached diaspora” of
Russians who after 1991 found themselves as minorities in
post-Soviet states other than the Russian Federation, due to
the immigration of Kazakhs from other countries and to
higher birthrates among Kazakhs than Russians (Laruelle
and Peyrouse, 2004, pp. 241–246; Smagulova, 2008,
pp. 446–447).
Nevertheless there is and will be8 a high percentage of
ethnic and–what is evenmore important– culturalRussians.
If one argues in terms of language skills and not ethnic self-
description, thenumbersofmembersof the titularnationand
of the “linguistically russiﬁed” minorities (Russians, Ukrai-
nians, Belarusians, Tatars, Germans, Koreans and others; cf.
Smagulova, 2008, pp. 446 and 459) are roughly equal. Even
more impressive are the numbers cited by research literature
on the secondary Russian skills of non-RussianKazakhstanis:
Braun estimates that 2/3 of ethnic Kazakhs in urban areas use
Russian as their daily language (Braun, 2000, p. 110), while
Altynbekova guesses that the ﬁgures concerning linguistic
self-informationgiven inofﬁcial contexts are too lowand that
probably more than 3/4 of Kazakhstanis know Russian
(Altynbekova, 2004, p. 83). Laitin adds that in their private
lives many representatives of the titular nation subvert the
ofﬁcial imperatives of Kazakhisation and deploy “slyness” to8 Olcott estimates that despite all demographic factors the future will
still see 20–25% Russians and other Slavs in Kazakhstan (Olcott, 2002, p.
222). Cf. also Kolstø, 2003, pp. 126–127.avoid becoming more familiar with the state language and
use Russian instead (Laitin, 1998, pp. 137–138). Although
independent surveys suggest a certain “deterioration in
Russian proﬁciency” (Smagulova, 2008, pp. 462–463),
according to ofﬁcial data the level of Kazakhs ﬂuent in the
Russian language increased from 64.2% in 1989 to 75.0% in
1999/2004 (Pavlenko, 2008a, p. 289).
There is no need to check the reliability of such statis-
tics, suggestions and estimations in detail to understand
that the sheer size of the minority and the widespread
command of Russian in the titular nation is a factor which
cannot be ignored in Kazakhstani language policy. The
reality of a bilingual populace demands a smoother,
nuanced language policy towards the Russian language
than in other post-Soviet countries (Pavlenko, 2008a,
p. 297). This is echoed in Nazarbaev’s rhetorical question
“How could there be a separate problem of the Russian-
speaking population, when all Kazakhs are Russian
speakers?” (quoted in Dave, 2007, pp. 104–105).
The early period of independent Kazakhstan’s language
policy continues late Soviet traditions. As early as before
the end of the Soviet Union, in September 1989, Kazakh
was elevated to the rank of ofﬁcial state language of the
Kazakh Soviet Republic. This move was reinforced in the
1993 constitution, which mentioned only Kazakh as a state
language. In response to Russian protests and the peak of
the emigration wave of ethnic Russians, this was corrected
in x 7 (2) of the constitution of 1995: “In state organisations
and organs of local self-administrative bodies the Russian
language shall be ofﬁcially used on equal grounds along
with the Kazakh language.”9 The same status was conferred
in the 1997 Law on Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan,
which constitutes the basis for all subsequent legal acts
concerning mass media etc.10 In all these documents the
interrelation of Kazakh and Russian remains more or less
vague and indistinctive.11
President Nazarbaev, who, from the very beginning,
favoured a double solution with Kazakh and Russian as
ofﬁcial languages, was forced into compromises but againracopGp s Gpsuearstcfoo9n >i9lpn vuolxjpojrpcaoj>.” [(.) the
Russian language, as the language that, objectively speaking, was the
most widespread, ceased to be deﬁned by the legally non-binding term
‘language of interethnic communication’ and received the constitutional
guarantee of equal functioning with the state language.] (Nazarbaev,
2006, p. 80).
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pp. 36–38). He has tirelessly repeated the compromise
formulae in his publications and speeches since the mid-
1990s. His rhetoric of equality does not, however, exclude
ongoing support for the Kazakh language in administration
and education. A specialized plan of Kazakhisation for the
years 2001–2010 seems to have been “relatively successful”
in fostering theKazakh language (Kuzabekova, 2008, p.172),
but the question of the parallel function of Russian remains.4. Trans-regional Russian communication online
So far my overview of the bilingual situation in
Kazakhstan has ignored one major factor – mediated
language usage, especially in the new interactive media
which transcend the one-to-many communication scheme
of the traditional mass media. What is the role of Russian in
Kazakhstanis’ Internet usage?
Albeit to a lesser degree than English and Chinese,
Russian serves as a means of communication between
Russian-speaking communities all over theworld. Speaking
about Kazakhstan, one cannot conﬁne the deﬁnition of the
Russian Internet or Runet to communication inside the
Russian Federation or on sites with the domain name .ru.
Referring to the broadest possible Runet deﬁnition as
proposed by Schmidt, Teubener and Zurawski – “all Russian
language communication ﬂows (including e-mail etc.)”
(Schmidt et al., 2006, p. 125) – I understand the Russian
Internet as consisting of all Russian-language-based
Internet activities taking place anywhere in the world.
The Kazakhstani Internet or Kaznet shared the devel-
opmental lag with the Russian Internet; the domain name
.kz was registered on 19 September 1994, half a year after
the registration of the neighbour’s .ru (17 March 1994). The
ﬁrst webpage in Kazakh (www.sci.kz) was designed three
to four years later. For 2009, the website for international
Internet usage counted 2,300,000 users in Kazakhstan,
which corresponds to a penetration of 14.9%.12
Access to the Kaznet is controlled by an oligopoly of
providers, with Kazakhtelekom in an almost monopoly
position (Kurgannikov, 2009). During the 2000s the state
established centralised control over the Kaznet by trans-
ferring responsibility for the domain .kz to the state
Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Informatisation
and Communications13 in 2004 and by merging this
agency with the Ministry of Culture and Information14 into
the Ministry of Communications and Informatisation15 in
2010. Since 2009 private blogs have been subject to the
same juridical liability as mass media.1612 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm, accessed 29 May
2010.
13 Agentstvo RK po informatizatsii i sviazi.
14 Ministerstvo kul’tury i informatsii.
15 Ministerstvo sviazi i informatsii.
16 O vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v nekotorye zakonodatel’nye akty
Respubliki Kazakhstan po voprosam informatsionno-kommunikatsionnykh
setei [On the Introduction of Changes and Completions in Some Legislative
Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Information-Communication
Networks], N 178-4 of 10 June 2009, (http://www.pavlodar.com/zakon/?
dok¼04418&all¼all, accessed 31 May 2010).Howfardoes this control by theKazakh state concern the
Russian Internet as deﬁned above? It cannot but affect
Internet use in Kazakhstan due to the popularity of web-
pages from the Russian Federation in the Central-Asian
republic. Spylog data from 2005 reveals that 1.1% of world-
wide Russian site visitors access them from Kazakhstan
(Schmidt et al., 2006, p. 126), and the Alexa ranking lists 15
.ru-addresses among the 40 most popular websites in
Kazakhstan, but only 8 .kz-addresses.17 When it comes to
active individual blogs written in Russian, in spring 2009
Almaty rankedeighth (3425) behindMoscow, St Petersburg,
Kiev,Minsk, Novosibirsk, Ekaterinburg and Samara (Yandex,
2009, p. 5). The Runet offers access to elaborated resources
of contemporary culture (music downloads and video-
sharing, for example from RuTube), whereas the Kazakh
section has – apart from poor access speed (Kurgannikov,
2009) and the comparatively small number of Kaznet sites
(Dmitrienko, 2006) – a serious quality problem which
expels about 80% of the Kaznet-users to non-Kazakhstani
sites (Bekirova, 2010). The most popular website in
Kazakhstan is www.mail.ru, while www.vkontakte.ru takes
fourth place (30 May 2010). Even if at ﬁrst glance there is
a Kazakh domain name this does not automatically mean
that the site has an administrator inside Kazakhstan. For
example www.odnoklassniki.kz leads directly to www.
odnoklassniki.ru (30 May 2010, Alexa-rank 11), a site on
which Kazakhstan appears only in the bottom-right-hand
corner, beneath all the regions of the Russian Federation.
As far as Internet control is concerned, Kazakhstan
adopted the Russian model of special registration software
obligatory for all Internet providers (Deibert et al., 2008, p.
181). Kazakhstan’s centralised Internet control became
discernible in 2005 when Kazakhtelekom blocked the web-
page www.borat.kz (Saunders, 2007, p. 236). This censoring
strategy was subsequently questioned by (younger)
Kazakhstani ofﬁcials (Saunders, 2007, p. 242; Schatz, 2008, p.
60), but the practise was revived when Kazakhtelekom
banned ZhZh (Russian LiveJournal) in 2009 because of Naza-
rbaev’s former son-in-law Rakhat Aliev’s blog rakhataliev.li-
vejournal.com/ containing compromising materials against
the Kazakhstani President (Taratuta and Zygar’, 2010). This
strategy of “‘event-based’ information control, which
temporally ‘shapes’ Internet access”, is viewed by Deibert
et al. (2008) as characteristic of many countries in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (p. 183).
But is access to Russian websites which are critical of
President Nazarbaev that dangerous for the Kazakhstani
government? Or to broaden this out: how does Runet use
affect the political, cultural and linguistic self-positioning of
its users?
Robert Saunders argued in 2006 that the prevailing
understanding of the Internet usage of minorities as “a
cause of resurgent nationalism” (Saunders, 2006, p. 49) is
misleading – at least for the majority of the users. Saunders
refers to an advanced group of globalised digerati (digitally
literate users; Saunders, 2006, p. 63, note 6) whose Internet
use does not imprison them in “virtual ghettos” (Saunders,17 The rest goes to the domain names .org and .com (www.alexa.com/
topsites/countries/KZ, accessed 21 May 2010).
18 “[.] laiawsljk >i9l – Gpsuearstcfoo9k >i9l, russljk >i9l lal
>i9l nfhoaxjpoam:opGp pb7foj> j aoGmjksljk >i9l – >i9l usPfzopk
jotfGraxjj c Gmpbam:ou< ;lpopnjlu” (http://www.nomad.su/?a¼3-
200703010020, accessed 31 May 2010). The reappearance of the adjec-
tive “interethnic” which Nazarbaev himself criticised a year before shows
the exchangeability of rhetoric formulae and the inclusiveness of his
rhetoric.
19 In his 1998 autobiography, Nazarbaev presented himself as a utopian
thinker in terms of trilinguality: “I believe that while both Kazakh and
Russian should be state languages, it would be even better to give some
other, although lesser, status to English as well. Unfortunately, however,
society is not yet ready for this.” (Nazarbayev, 1998, p. 126). As the
strategy targets the youngest generations (children’s books are published
in three languages: www.almatykitap.kz, accessed 31 May 2010) this
utopian character may at some point be overcome in the wake of the
ongoing “language ideology transformation process” diagnosed by
Smagulova (2008, p. 469).
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world. Saunders’ optimism is based on a positive version of
media determinism in the sense of MacLuhan: if one is to
believe him, the “emancipatory medium” Internet has
“inclusionary rather than exclusionary” (Saunders, 2006,
pp. 46 and 51) effects. The Russian aspect of the users’
identity is not emphasised by being integrated in a trans-
national and deterritorialized network:
“Rather than being ‘Russiﬁed’ by their cyberspatial
experiences, ethnic Russians roaming the electronic
corridors of the virtual near abroad are instead being
‘globalized’, that is, undergoing identity shifts which
promote the inclusion in the deterritorialized commu-
nity of transnational elites [.]” (Saunders, 2006, p. 50)
It would demand extensive and representative empir-
ical research to prove whether Saunders’ statements about
Russian Internet usage in general apply for the suggested
transnational identity of ethnic Russian Internet users in
Kazakhstan. What is certain is the fact that for the near
abroad and for the digital diaspora (cf. Schmidt et al., 2006,
pp. 122–123) in general the ethnic criterion is insufﬁcient
because Russian webpages are not only visited by ethnic
Russian minorities in the near abroad:
“In addition to ethnic Russians, a generation of lapsed
cultural Russians, i.e., homo post-Sovietici [sic], are also
drawn to the RuNet. Russian is the dominant language of
the Internet use inUzbekistan, Kazakhstan, andanumber
of other CARs [Central-Asian Republics]. Due to the
robustness of Russian-language cyberspace, Russo-
phones from all over the FSU [Former Soviet Union]
choose to spend their cyber-time in theRuNet rather than
their indigenous cyberspaces.” (Saunders, 2009, p. 18)
As far as a more advanced understanding of identity
than the one adopted in this quote is concerned, one needs
to say farewell to the outdated idealistic notion of cultural
subjects who – determined by their identity – must
perform certain cultural actions. It is muchmore promising
to approach cultural identity as a performative category.
Russian as amedium of communication (online and ofﬂine)
is relevant not only for cultural Russians (cf. Pavlenko,
2008a, p. 298) or the actively “Russian speaking-pop-
ulation” (Laitin, 1998, pp. 263–264; Pavlenko, 2008b, p. 60),
but for all people who at least occasionally communicate in
Russian or consume Russian cultural and commercial
offers. I suggest calling them virtual Russians, giving pref-
erence to this term over “kiberruskie” [cyber-Russians]
(Saunders, 2004, p. 189) because the notion of virtual habits
better reﬂects the potential of coexistence with other
situational identities. Russian virtual habits contribute to
the patchwork identities in contemporary Kazakhstan
which Sally Cummings describes as “primarily relational
rather than intrinsic” – with Russia, Russians and the
Russian language in the role of the “signiﬁcant ‘other’”
(Cummings, 2010, p. 183).
5. Normative trilinguality
To what extent can such a performative and situa-
tional linguistic cyberhabit pose a threat to the country’sofﬁcial language policy? On the one hand, Nazarbaev,
who originally voted against the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, has since 1991 made major efforts to stay on good
terms with his Russian neighbour (Cummings, 2010). On
the other hand, the Internet is actively used by Kazakh-
stani ofﬁcials for the creation of a Kazakhstani state
brand (Saunders, 2007, p. 226), promoting a particular
understanding of Kazakshilik (Kazakhness). The Internet
is one of the arenas of Nazarbaev’s hi-tech feudalism (cf.
Ibraeva, 2005, p. 429), with its ambitious Norwegian-
style investment program.
In order to achieve the ambitious goals of this hi-tech
programme, skills in languages other than Kazakh are
essential, and Nazarbaev acknowledges this very clearly
in Novyi Kazakhstan v novom mire. Poslanie prezidenta
Respubliki Kazakhstan Nursultana Nazarbaeva narodu
Kazakhstana [A New Kazakhstan in a New World:
Address by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan
Nursultan Nazarbayev to the People of Kazakhstan] in
2007: “Kazakh as the state language, Russian as the
language of interethnic communication, and English as
the language of successful integration into the global
economy.”18
One may ﬁnd this trilingual strategy utopian (espe-
cially when it comes to English competence, but also to
Kazakh proﬁciency among non-Kazakh citizens),19 but its
rhetoric is deﬁnitely not exclusivist. What is more,
languages are not regarded as a goal in themselves but as
means for other – rather economic – purposes, something
that becomes clear from the addition of a fourth postu-
late: of advanced computer competence (cf. Khruslov,
2006, p. 146). In 2006 Nazarbaev emphatically linked
the Kazakhs’ nomadic tradition with the mobility and
multilocality of Internet communication (2006, p. 366).
Therefore one cannot but agree with Edward Schatz, who
assumes that “the imperatives of globalisation and the
concomitant need to create a technocratic elite” have
tempered the ethnicisation process in Kazakhstan
(Schatz, 2000, p. 495).
There is another level where the trilingual programme is
clearly not a utopian postulate but a consistent practise –
ofﬁcial state webpages, with their embracing trilingual
strategy such as Oﬁtsial’nyi sait Prezidenta Respubliki
Kazakhstan [Ofﬁcial Site of the President of the Republic of
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behind this webpage (employees of the company RealSoft)
are working in Russian ﬁrst with English translations
appearing later and even the Kazakh version being less
complete than theRussianone.21 Thepage title in the top line
of the browser remains Russian in all language versions.22
6. Towards a cyberlinguistic deﬁnition of Eurasia
Nazarbaev links his trilingual strategy to an alleged
Eurasian quality in the multi-ethnic Kazakhstan. In his
2005 book V serdtse Evrazii [In the Heart of Eurasia] he
ascribes an information mission for the “Eurasian super-
continent” to the new capital Astana:
“Kazakhstan is a Eurasian country, its new capital one of
the geographical centres of the huge Eurasian continent.
[.] In the new century the economic, technological and
information streams of the emerging Eurasian space
will ﬂow through our capital.”23
The geographic European dimension of Kazakhstan is
comparably counterfactual as the postulated English proﬁ-
ciency. What helps to maintain the vision of the imagined
Eurasian space is less the indisputably European language
English than the linguistic reality of the Euro-Asian language
Russian. Thus one might deduce that Nazarbaev’s notion of
“Eurasia” is co-constituted by the Russian language and that
the connection of Russian with Internet usage justiﬁes
referring to a proto-Eurasian function of theRussian Internet.
To provide a – slightly provocative – deﬁnition: Eurasia is the
post-Russian space where a virtual community occasionally
turns to the Russian language in online communication. The
Russian-language section of the Kaznet can thus be regarded
as a sine qua non componentof a Eurasianet (which, however,
is not embracing all of the Eurasian real space).
This thesis encompasses a re-linguistiﬁcation of the
spatial turn.When it comes to the Internet, the connection of
space and language cannot be described in terms of geo-
linguistics, but of virtual linguistics. Due to the decentralised
nature of theweb, this communicative, cyberlinguistic space20 Accessed 30 May 2010. The same trilinguality concerns other ofﬁcial
webpages such as www.parlam.kz, www.government.kz or www.astana.
kz (accessed 1 June 2010).
21 When accessed on 31 May 2010, the column “Ofﬁcial Documents –
Decrees of the President” in the English version listed 63 times the
Russian negation “oft” in Cyrillic before providing the ﬁrst available
document “On conferring State Premium to the Republic of Kazakhstan in
the area of science and technology” (http://www.akorda.kz/www/www_
akorda_kz.nsf/sections-main?OpenForm&ids¼380&id_doc¼3FD5E7ADC1
2680BD062576F7005B68E0&lang¼en&L1¼L3&L2¼L3-24). The Kazakh
version seems to be secondary to the Russian one as well although in the
Kazakh equivalent “Rfsnj құhattar – Trfijefot Harm9қtar9” there
were less scattered “oft” than in the English version (http://www.akorda.
kz/www/www_akorda_kz.nsf/sections-main?OpenForm&id_doc¼3FD5E
7ADC12680BD062576F7005B68E0&ids¼380&lang¼kz).
22 In the case of www.astana.kz the top line appears in Russian ﬁrst as
well. Only if one clicks the link to the Kazakh versionkz.astana.kz this
changes to Kazakh (accessed 1 June 2010).
23 “Laiawstao – fcraijksla> straoa, fGp opca> stpmjxa d pejo ji
GfpGravjyfsljw xfotrpc pGrpnopGp FcraijkslpGp natfrjla. [.] yfrfi
oazu opcu< stpmjxu bueut Prptflat: c opcpn stpmftjj ;lpopnjyfsljf,
tfwopmpGjyfsljf, jovprnaxjpoo9f Pptplj raicjca<7fGps>
fcraijkslpGp Prpstraostca.” (Nazarbaev, 2005, p. 107).can only vaguely be circumscribed because its concrete
localities are extremely difﬁcult to grasp. For the proto-
Eurasian Russianwebspace national boundaries are relevant
only in the case of ﬁltering (Deibert et al., 2008).
When developing similar cyberlinguistic criteria for the
Eurasian virtual space, one must not fall back into the
assumption of stable identities or evencontinuous linguistic
habits. As in the case of the multiple identities which the
multinational citizens of Kazakhstan combine in themselves
(cf. Schatz, 2000), there are multiple cyberlingual habits as
well. The linguistic identities of the Russian-using web
community vary depending on the communicative, inter-
active or consumerist purpose of their Internet usage. The
Russophone identity of the Eurasian web community
provides no more than a situational linguistic habit.
7. Cybercolonisation of Eurasia via the Runet?
Have we thus, thanks to cyber-Rusophonia, arrived at
a harmonious coexistence of situational language habits
without any hegemonic implications?
If Marx is right that quantity transforms into quality, the
impact of big linguistic cybercommunities like English,
Chinese or Russian on other national communities does
imply possible hegemonic tendencies. Thus simple diffusion
models of technological development (Ellis, 1999; Perﬁl’ev,
2003, pp. 97–135, Rose, 2006) cannot grasp the power
implications of cyberglobalization (Ebo, 2001).What ismore,
supra-ethnic linguistic identities as “Russophones” have
been seen as “politically incorrect” bymany in Kazakhstan.24
In all the cases mentioned, associations with the colo-
nial past come as a reﬂex. The colonialist use of Russian
mass media in Soviet propaganda (cf. Saunders, 2009, p. 3)
is vividly remembered in Kazakhstan, which justiﬁes
asking whether there is any continuity of Soviet strategies
in the present media policy of the Russian Federation. Is
there a Russian cyberimperialism following the American
model (Saunders, 2009, p. 5)? The theoretician of cyber-
imperialism Rusciano (2001) gives a critical answer
because of the decentralized structure of the Internet
(p. 15) and of its potential to be used by grassroots orga-
nisations. One might add the widely practised anti-disci-
plinary use (in the sense of de Certeau 1990, p. XL) of the
Internet, for example in jokes about Russian politicians
available on the Runet.25 What then about jokes about
Nazarbaev, stored in the Runet?26
Glitches aside, might the linguistic dimension of the sort
of cyberimperialism which Rusciano calls “metrocentric24 Kolstø 1998, p. 63; Shaibakova, 2005, p. 41. This is connected with the
“banal nationalist” (in the sense of Billig, 1995) assumption that an ethnic
Kazakh must be able to speak Kazakh, and if s/he fails, it is regarded as
justiﬁed to stigmatise him/her as a mankurt (Dave, 2010). For the other
side of the term’s medal, the Russian discourse on Russophonia with its
recent paradigm shift to aggressive internationalism, see Gorham 2010.
25 See search.anekdot.ru/?query¼%EF%F3%F2%E8%ED&rubrika¼j,
accessed 1 June 2010.
26 For example http://search.anekdot.ru/?query¼%ED%E0%E7%E0%F0%
E1%E0%E5%E2&rubrika¼j (accessed 30 May 2010). For a possible conﬁr-
mation of this suspicion see www.gorychiy.narod.ru/2001/K/0033.htm,
accessed 1 June 2010. For more on www.anekdot.ru and its “tremendous
popularity”, at least within Russia, cf. Gorny (2006).
29 “[.] vprnjrpcaojf bmaGpPrj>topGp em> Rpssjj pb7fstcfoopGp
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case as well? Do Russians from the Russian Federation like
representatives of other “[.] core nations consciously or
unconsciously deﬁne and disseminate language and
linguistic constructs for understanding the world through
the media of cyberspace” (Rusciano, 2001, p. 11) and
perform acts of linguistic imperialism in so doing?
Historically, Soviet (Russian language) TV included the
Soviet Republics as a culturally Russian territory. Such inclu-
sive TV entertainment can be understood as a non-dividing
strategy of cultural hegemony. In contrast to the hegemonic
strategy of divide et impera, in this case cultural hegemony is
established by non-exteriorisation. In this sense, Russian
politicians from all parts of the political spectrum have
demanded support for the external-internal Russian diaspora
in the near abroad ever since 1991 (cf. Saunders, 2005, p.174).
After Russia’s withdrawal from the Central-Asian scene in
the1990sdue to internal political andeconomicpriorities and
a long period of ambiguity towards the “compatriots” in the
near abroad (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2004, p. 277), one could
observe Russia’s return to Central Asia in the 2000s (see
Matveeva,2007).RussianTVentertainment isoncemoreused
for promoting the former common Soviet space (Hutchings &
Rulyova, 2009, pp. 42, 94 and 169), combined with Russian
cultural hegemony. Moscow’s political strategists [polittekh-
nologi] are looking to the near abroad once again.
As some of the present political strategists are trained
computer specialists, use of the Runet can be understood as
a tool of soft power as well: “[.] language and the Internet
are being viewed and used as tools for ‘soft power’ in
promoting Russian interests both at home and abroad”
(Gorham, 2010). Thus what Michael Gorham calls “virtual
Rusophonia” is not just a consumers’ and communicators’
decision alone. Rusophonia has been promoted since the
Putin administration’s “international turn” with the
declaration of the “Year of the Russian Language” in 2007.
A special target is the near abroad. The website of the
state organisation responsible, Fond “Russkii mir” [The
RussianWorld Foundation], founded in 2007, explicitly says
of its target group:
“‘Russkii mir’ is not just Russians, not just citizens of the
Russian Federation, not just compatriots in the coun-
tries of the near and far abroad, emigrants, natives of
Russian and their descendants. It is also foreign citizens
who speak Russian, who study or teach it, all those who
are sincerely interested in Russian and who are con-
cerned about its future.”27
This broad and inclusive notion28 obviously comes very
close to my earlier deﬁnition of virtual Russians, but in the27 “Russljk njr – ;tp of tpm:lp russljf, of tpm:lp rpssj>of, of tpm:lp
oazj spptfyfstcfoojlj c straoaw bmjhofGp j eam:ofGp iarubfh:>,
;njGraot9, c9wpex9 ji Rpssjj j jw Pptpnlj. ;tp f7f j jopstraoo9f
Graheaof, Gpcpr>7jf oa russlpn >i9lf, jiuya<7jf jmj PrfPpea<7jf
fGp, csf tf, ltp jslrfoof jotfrfsufts> Rpssjfk, lpGp cpmouft ff
bueu7ff.” (Russkii mir, http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/fund/
about, accessed 30 May 2010).
28 As Michael Gorham (2010) demonstrates, “Russkii mir” also makes
use of traditional topoi of communality and conciliarity (sobornost’)
borrowed from the Slavophile axiology of inclusion (cf. Uffelmann, 1999),
the same source which inspired the inclusive rhetoric of Eurasianism.case of “Russkii mir” the broad deﬁnition is envisaged as
a means of metrocentric cyberimperialism in the sense of
Rusciano (2001). The Diasporas are a special goal of the
foundation, mentioned directly after the promotion of
positive public opinion about Russia around the world.29
The advocates of a Russian world have detected the
implicit, subcutaneous “propaganda” effect of the Runet,
based on the Russian language as an online carrier of
a certain world view (cf. Troﬁmova, 2004, p. 55):
“The Runet is an ‘impersonal’ but highly effective carrier
of the language, the very .ru-zone which gives all users
the possibility to get information and communicate
independently from citizenship and at the same time to
broaden the Russian-speaking space.”30
On 9 April 2010 “Russkii mir” held a conference devoted
exclusively to Russkoiazychnye v Tsentral’noi Azii [Russian
Speakers in Central Asia].31 So far, however, the actual effects
of “Russkii mir’s” linguistic imperialism in the near abroad
seem insigniﬁcant.32 But the possibility that the Russian
minority in Kazakhstan could be targeted by “Russkiy mir”
as a “ﬁfth column” and that the foundation’s traditional
linguistic imperialismmay advance tomoremodernmeans
of linguistic cyberimperialism cannot be denied.
8. Resistance by emulation
What are the Kazakhstanis’ strategies of resistance to
the potential new Russian linguistic-cyberimperialistic
threat?
It would be misleading to return to the research
stereotype of “nationalising regimes” all over Central Asia,
which suggests an antagonistic post-colonial attitude
towards the former colonialist in the sense of Fanon (1991)
and Chatterjee (1986). If one concedes an early period of
national-ethnic orientation (1990–1995), this was,
however, followed by a more multicultural conception in
the second period (since 1995; cf. Shaibakova, 2005, pp.
40–42). Accordingly, Adams et al., who try to describe the
Kazakhstani strategy with a deductive pattern of post-
colonial resistance directed simultaneously against inter-
national consumerism and the previous colonizer, admit
a speciﬁcally defensive gesture instead of antagonism:
“[.] we can explore the dimensions of cultural conﬂict
in post-Soviet Kazakhstan as an example of a post-
colonial resistance to cultural globalization: the target isnofoj>, rasPrpstraofojf ioaojk p oazfk straof; / ciajnpefkstcjf s
ejasPpranj” (Russkii mir, http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/fund/
about, accessed 30 May 2010).
30 “Ruoft – ;tp «ofpeuzfcmfoo9k», op cfs:na ;vvfltjco9k opsjtfm:
>i9la, ta sana> ipoa .ru, lptpra> eaft cpinphopst: cpsPrjojnat:
jovprnaxj< j pb7at:s> csfn Ppm:ipcatfm>n ofiacjsjnp pt
Graheaostca j tfn san9n raszjr>t: russlp>i9yopf Prpstraostcp.”
(Iatsenko, 2007).
31 www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/new/fund/news0274.html,
accessed 30 May 2010.
32 Even inside the Russian Federation the technologically rather unad-
vanced “Russkii mir” website, which possesses only a few interactive
offers, ranks no higher than 31,596 on alexa.com (www.alexa.com/
siteinfo/russkiymir.ru, accessed 26 May 2010).
33 “[N]i de l’Occident, ni de l’Orient” (Chaadaev, 1991, p. 89).
34 “Die ‘Logik des Verbindens‘ ist dabei stets ein Instrument der ‘Logik
des Trennens’.” (Höllwerth, 2007, p. 702).
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ing settler population), and external (the continuing
colonial domination of the culture markets); the actions
tend to be proactive, intended to reafﬁrm and bolster
local culture rather than being concerned with ‘pollu-
tion’ [.] the tone of the response tends to be defensive,
in part because of continued dependence on the colo-
nizer and, again, in part of the colonized mentality.”
(Adams et al., 2007, p. 84)
As shown above, the presidential administration of
Kazakhstan addresses the “Russian problem” with a non-
antagonistic and rather inclusive strategy. It tries to avoid
a direct opposition between Kazakh (nation) and Russian
(language) and “appease both the Russian-speakers and
Russophone Kazakhs” (Dave, 2007, p. 166). After a period of
concessions to Kazakh ethnic nationalism around 1993,
Nazarbaev returned to his inclusive strategy for con-
structing Kazakhstani identity from the early 1990s
(Akiner, 1995, p. 69) and has since then been preserving his
rhetoric of trilinguality. But is not the Russian component of
this trilingual constellation a paradoxical or even counter-
productive means of “resistance” against Russia?
No, because Kazakh identity has over centuries devel-
oped by departing from a Russian or Soviet starting point.
Kazakh national identity was invented in early Soviet
times – during the so-called korenizatsiia – by Russians in
Russian (Saunders, 2007, p. 244) and in distinction from
the Russian identity. The Sovietisation of Kazakhstan fol-
lowed a “dual course, enacting russiﬁcation policies at the
same time as maintaining and strengthening national
institutions” (Pavlenko, 2008a, p. 281). Nazarbaev, former
general secretary of the Communist Party of the Kazakh
Soviet Republic, based his early politics on the Soviet
model, from which he made small steps towards Kazakh-
isation. Kazakh identity has thus developed by starting
from a Russian or Soviet model, by ﬁrst emulating this
model and by slowly introducing non-Russian aspects
such as nomad identity or clan lineage. In contrast to what
Homi K. Bhabha describes as the hegemonic imposition or
else subversive appropriation of a “not quite” identity of
the colonized in comparison to the colonizers (Bhabha,
1994, p. 87), the Kazakhstani way of resisting and gain-
ing agency starts from the “almost exactly” and then
introduces small steps of differentiation. This defensive,
slow tactic refrains from the more widespread overtly
antagonistic post-colonial attitude (cf. Schatz, 2000, p.
489). It is more post-colonial in the temporal than anti-
colonial in the antagonistic sense.
One expression of this emulative-defensive strategy can
be found in the inclusive and embracing logic of argu-
mentation of the “both. and.” type. On the object level
this was already observed in the existing research litera-
ture, for example concerning Nazarbaev’s “balancing act
between russiﬁcation and nativization” (Pavlenko, 2008a,
p. 302) or his deliberate avoidance of “making a choice
between an ethnic and a civic nation concept” (Kolstø,
1998, p. 56). By “sponsoring Kazakh ethno-cultural regen-
eration and maintenance of a multi-ethnic polity deﬁned
by the centrality of the Russian language” (Dave, 2007,
p. 163), Nazarbaev tried to give the impression that hepursued “both a multinational society and a homeland of
the ethnic Kazakhs at the same time” (Kolstø, 1998, p. 56).
The vagueness and apparent contradiction of Nazar-
baev’s inclusive arguments as diagnosed in research litera-
ture is not a problem for understanding this strategy but the
solution for a better understanding itself. Differing from
antagonistic post-colonial attitudes, this “both. and.”
strategy tries to overcome the being “in the gap” as it is
known from Petr Chaadaev’s famous ﬁrst Filosoﬁcheskoe
pis’mo [Philosophical Letter], according to which Russia
belonged “neither to the Occident nor to the Orient”.339. Towards a Eurasianist post-colonial logic of
argumentation?
In contrast to the geocultural gap envisaged by the
Russian Westerniser Chaadaev in 1829, the Russian tradi-
tional Eurasianism of the 1920s implemented an argu-
mentative strategy which is predominantly inclusive. This
becomes obvious at ﬁrst glance from the manifesto of
Russian Eurasianism of the 1920s, Iskhod k Vostoku [Exodus
to the East]. The argumentation starts with a self-exclusion
from Europe comparable to Chaadaev’s:
“Russians and those who belong to the peoples of ‘the
Russian world’ are neither Europeans nor Asians.
Merging with the native element of culture and life
which surrounds us, we are not ashamed to declare
ourselves Eurasians.” (Savitskii et al., 1996, p. 4)
But then the authors Savitskii, Suvchinskii, Trubetskoi
and Florovskii advocate a new ﬁgure of “inclusion of
a whole circle of East European and Asian peoples into the
mental sphere of the culture of the Russian world”
(Savitskii et al., 1996, p. 4). The functional relationship
between the argumentative tropes of exclusion and inclu-
sion becomes clear from the following quote: “[.] Russia is
not merely ‘the West’ but also ‘the East’, not only ‘Europe’
but also ‘Asia,’ and even not Europe at all, but ‘Eurasia’”
(Savitskii, 1996, p. 6). Internal inclusion (Eurasia) serves as
a means for external exclusion (of Europe).
Despite obvious differences on various levels (cf.
Laruelle, 2008, p. 205), a comparable functional sequence of
inclusion for the sake of exclusion can be found in Russian
Neo-Eurasianism, as Alexander Höllwerth described in his
analysis of the logic of Aleksandr Dugin’s argumentation:
“The ‘logic of connecting’ is always an instrument of the
‘logic of division’.”34
Although in the case of Dugin the alleged internal
inclusion jeopardizes Kazakh independence and masks
Russian cultural and political expansionism, the Russian
Eurasianism has served as a philosophical model which the
Kazakh government propagated actively (Khruslov, 2006, p.
148). That can be institutionally seen in the example of the
L.N. GumilyovEurasianNational University inAstana,which
in its self-description links the Kazakhstani president with
the Russian Eurasianist Gumilev in embracing rhetoric:
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Nazarbaev, gave the Eurasian National University the
name of Lev Nikolaevich Gumilev. [.] The head of state
is a convinced supporter of Kazakhstan’s national
revival and of the Eurasian idea. [.] The most impor-
tant point for Kazakhstan is that he [Gumilev] worked
[.] on the problem of the mutuality of Turks and Slavs
in the context of the unity of the peoples of Eurasia.”35
Since Gumilev’s theory of ethnicity is no less incom-
patible with a pan-ethnic notion of Eurasia than Dugin’s
Neo-Eurasianism (cf. Bassin, 2009, pp. 894–895), Nazar-
baev has apparently learnt less from the content of Russian
Eurasianism than from its argumentative forms: he
includes Russian language in his internal trilingual strategy
while the Kazakh information space is protected against
Russian newspapers, Russian cable TV and against certain
Russia-based websites, as Khruslov points out:
“At the same time the national mass media have to fulﬁl
the task of gaining information independence from the
Russian mass media and to form a homogeneous
information space of the Republic [of Kazakhstan].”36
Nazarbaev’s “Authoritarianism2.0” (Kalathil, 2003, p. 43)
deploys cybertrilinguality for the sake of excluding critical
media from abroad. Kazakhwebpages arewritten in Russian
topromote thepresident’sworldview(parallel to thedozens
of translations of his books into foreign languages), but the
domain name .kz is supposed to remain an emblem reserved
for the privatized state brand Kazakhstan/Nazarbaev.
In camouﬂaging the purpose of division under a cover of
multiple connections, Nazarbaev is diplomatically more
successful37 than the Russian Eurasianists who – in every
generation – have not held back from declaring that among
the Eurasian peoples “the Russian people has the central
position” (Savitskii et al., 1996, p. 4). Nevertheless the
similarity in the connecting-disconnecting or including-
excluding strategies is striking. One might risk providing
a second provocative, rather abstract, non-spatial deﬁnition
of ‘Eurasianism’: Eurasianist is a rhetoric of inclusion for the
sake of pragmatic exclusion.
10. Unsurprising coincidences
The related Kazakhstani “Eurasianist” logic displays
rather unsurprising coincidences with various Russian,35 “Trfijefot RfsPubmjlj Laiawstao O.A. Oaiarbafc Prjscpjm
Fcraijkslpnu oaxjpoam:opnu uojcfrsjtftu jn> M:ca Ojlpmafcjya
Gunjmfca. [.] Gmaca Gpsuearstca – ubfhefoo9k stprpoojl
oaxjpoam:opGp cpirphefoj> Laiawstaoa j fcraijkslpk jefj. [.] Em>
Laiawstaoa PfrcpstfPfoopf nfstp jnfft tp, ytp po [Gunjmfc] rabptam
[.] oae Prpbmfnpk ciajnpefkstcj> t<rlpc j smac>o c lpotflstf
fejostca oarpepc Fcraijj.” (Selivestrov, 2006).
36 “Peopcrfnfoop Pfrfe rfsPubmjlaosljnj SNJ Ppstacmfoa iaeaya
pbrftfoj> jovprnaxjpoopk ofiacjsjnpstj pt rpssjksljw SNJ,
vprnjrpcaoj> fejopGp jovprnaxjpoopGp Prpstraostca rfsPubmjlj
[Laiawstao], [.]” (Khruslov, 2006, p. 147).
37 One needs to distinguish this authoritarian strategy of inclusion from
a postmodern paradoxical inclusion of contradictions. Nazarbaev,
however, made a postmodern attempt of self-refuting when he changed
Kazakhstan’s politics towards Borat, becoming self-ironic and therefore
ultimately embracing all contradictions (Saunders, 2008, p. 127).Soviet, post-Soviet and post-colonial argumentative logics.
As seen above, the Kazakhstani and the Russian Eurasian-
isms share a connection-dividing logic. The Nazarbaev
administration’s ambiguous Eurasianist inclusionary rhet-
oric, which serves as a “newspeak” “masking” practical
Kazakhisation (Laruelle, 2008, pp.172 and 181), cannot deny
its origins in Soviet language policy. As Schatz diagnoses:
“Post-Soviet Kazakhstani internationalism was shaped
bymany of the discursive and institutional legacies of its
Soviet-era predecessor. As in the Soviet era, the
Kazakhstani elite propagated ambiguous cultural cate-
gories designed for universalistic appeal and broad
resonance.” (Schatz, 2000, p. 491)
The Kazakhstani preservation of the “colonial” language
Russian as a means of interethnic communication is akin to
the majority of African post-colonial countries which
retained the former colonial languages for the analogous
purpose of transregional, interethnic and international
communication (cf. Pavlenko, 2008a, p. 300).
What is more surprising is that Nazarbaev’s “both.
and.” strategy meets with approval from a Western
perspective focussing on human rights. Eschment echoes
Nazarbaev in 1998: “A rational solution would be a ‘both.
and.’, a balanced bilinguality.”38 The German scholar even
subscribes to the topos of Kazakhstanis as predestined to
think inEurasian inclusivecategories (Eschment,1998,p.117).
Less surprising is the last – but politically most relevant
– coincidence: the structural similarity of the Kazakhstani
linguistic internationalism and the recent Russian media
expansionism. The new Russian embracement strategy of
non-distinction and the Kazakh rhetoric of non-exclusion
come – as far as the logic of connection is concerned – close
to each other. The two authoritarianisms – the post-Soviet
Kazakhstani and the Russian of the Putin era – share
a comparable embracing rhetoric designed for exclusive
purposes. This makes it possible for Russian Neo-Eura-
sianists to quote Nazarbaev’s renewed 23 May 2010 appeal
to the Kazakhstani people to learn Russian and English
authoritatively on their website evrazia.org (evrazia.org/
news/13273; accessed 31 May 2010).
Time will show whether the two inclusive strategies –
the Russian and the Kazakhstani – will engage in open
conﬂict with each other or whether, eventually, the
decentralized structure of the Internet wins out against
both unfriendly inclusion strategies.References
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